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AFTER HOUSE BILL 920: AN ANALYSIS OF
NEEDED REAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
DROPERTY TAX RELIEF HAS BEEN THE CONCERN OF LEGISLATURES
everywhere since property taxes were first enacted, and the Ohio
legislature has been no exception. In 1976, after duly noting the need for
real property tax reform, the General Assembly enacted Amended Sub-
stitute House Bill 920 (hereinafter referred to as H.B. 920).' The thrust
of H.B. 920 was to eliminate "windfall" tax increases to local govern-
ments resulting from property reassessments and reappraisals How-
ever, as became apparent subsequently, the elimination of windfall tax
revenue increases for local governments did not translate into real prop-
erty tax relief for all classes of Ohio property owners.
The principle of H.B. 920 is simple. The dollar amounts collected from
a community pursuant to certain voted levies must remain constant.
Therefore, if a reappraisal or reassessment increases the total tax value
of a community's real property, then H.B. 920 provides the entire com-
munity with a dollar for dollar credit to offset any increase in the total
taxes due from the community. While these principles are sound in
theory, the practical aspects of H.B. 920 have made it a nightmare for
some property owners.
A case in point is a certain residential property located in Cuyahoga
County. In 1978, the tax value of the property was $11,020,' based on the
County Auditor's 1976 reappraisal. In 1979 the County Auditor updated
the tax value to $15,890,' an increase of 44.2%. The corresponding tax
increase for the parcel was $134.08, a 25.8% increase.'
In stark contrast, if not contradiction, to the previous example stands
a commercial parcel' located in the same city, on the same street as the
residential property just reviewed. In 1979 the Cuyahoga County Audi-
' Am. Sub. H.B. 920, 111th General Assembly (1976), 1976 OHIo LAws 3182
[hereinafter cited as H.B. 9201. Though this law dealt with more than tax relief,
its primary impact has been on real property taxation law; for example, H.B. 920
created the Department of Tax Equalization and amended 99 sections of the Ohio
Revised Code, enacted two new sections and repealed two sections. Id.
1976 OHIo LAws 3194.
1978 Tax Duplicate, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, parcel number 644-11-031,
located at 25530 Lakeshore Boulevard.
' 1979 Tax Duplicate, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, parcel number 644-11-031,
located at 25530 Lakeshore Boulevard.
' Part of the increase was undoubtedly due to an increase in the tax rate
from 62.00 mills to 66.80 mills.
6 1978 and 1979 Tax Duplicate, Cuyahoga County, Ohio parcel number
644-02-004, located at 22701 Lakeshore Boulevard.
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tor updated the tax value of the property from $802,770 to $882,770, an
$80,000 (or 9.97%) increase.7 Despite the increase in value, the taxes due
actually decreased $493.80 (or 1.3%), from $37,829.50 in the tax year
1978 to $37,335.70 in tax year 1979.'
Equally disturbing is the fact that the examples above are the rule
and not the exception. Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella
reported that, in 1977, 60% to 70% of all businesses received actual tax
decreases on their 1976 taxes' despite valuation increases, while almost
80% of residential property owners received both tax and valuation in-
creases.0 County-wide figures" indicate that in tax year 1979 residential
property values increased 38.4% over 1978, from $4,518,452,880 to
$6,254,572,470, excluding any increases from new properties. Because of
that value increase, residential property taxpayers paid an estimated
$31.5 million more in property taxes"2 over the 1978 tax year. At the
same time, county-wide figures 3 for commercial and industrial proper-
ties reported the 1979 valuation increasing 14.1% over 1978 valuations
from $2,169,042,500 to $2,475,267,170, excluding any increases from new
properties. Despite that increase in value, commercial and industrial
taxpayers as a group paid an estimated $5.2 million less in taxes for the
1979 tax year than they did in the previous tax year."
The result has been a continuing shift in the burden of taxation to the
residential property taxpayer, which has moved the Cuyahoga County
homeowner's share of real property taxes from 63% of the 1975 taxes to
68% of the 1976 taxes, and to 72% of the 1979 taxes.0 These
homeowners, with the sympathetic prompting of local elected officials,
turned to the state's lawmakers for a remedy to what they felt was un-
fair treatment in their property taxes."
Effective tax relief may require further legislation, but before this
task can begin, a reinterpretation of the current property tax statutes
in light of Article XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution is necessary.
This Note will analyze the current state of real property tax law in
Ohio and its relationship to H.B. 920. The tax reform provision of H.B.
7Id,
8Id.
Taxes for 1976 were billed in December of 1976, payable in two in-
stallments, by January and July of 1977.
"I The Clev. Press, March 9, 1978, at A13, col. 1.
" Abstract of Real Property, DTE Form 93 (Rev. March 1977), 1978, 1979.
12 Interview with Vincent C. Campanella, Cuyahoga County Auditor,
Cleveland, Ohio, July 30, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Campanella interview].
13 Abstract of Real Property, DTE Form 93 (Rev. March 1977), 1978, 1979.
" Campanella interview, supra note 12.
1 The Clev. Press, Aug. 28, 1979, at A7, col. 4.
1" Clev. Plain Dealer, Sept. 5, 1979, at A-1, col. 4. Perhaps the most com-
prehensive coverage of the technical and political issues involved can be found in
Kuznik, Taxation Without Representation, CLEV. MAGAZINE, April, 1980, at 76.
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920 will be separately analyzed from both the historical perspective sur-
rounding its passage and the technical perspective of its mathematical
calculations. These perspectives will explain the seeming contradictions
in the above examples. A further analysis of the relationship between
taxation by uniform rule under Article XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution
will be undertaken. The conclusion will focus on a constitutionally valid
solution to the problem of property tax reform while, at the same time,
noting several essential and unusual questions.
II. THE OHIO REAL PROPERTY TAX BILL AND
AMENDED HOUSE BILL 920
A. The Property Tax Bill in Ohio
Although some parts of Ohio's real property tax bill are unique to
the state, for the purpose of initiating analysis the tax bill can still be
reduced to the elements it has in common with property tax bills of
other states. It should be noted here that this note will deal solely with
the real property tax bill. Real property is defined by Ohio law to in-
clude land, all crops, trees, buildings, structures, improvements and fix-
tures added thereto."8 This is distinguished from personal property,
which generally consists of movable items not permanently affixed to or
part of the real estate," and which is taxed under its own statutes.2
The two most fundamental elements of any real property tax bill are
property value and tax rate." The tax bill in its most basic form deter-
mines the tax liability by multiplying the taxable value of the property
by the established tax rate.' This article will first analyze value as it
relates to the Ohio real property tax bill and then look at the tax rate as
established by Ohio law.
The process of determining the tax bill for each property is triggered
by the estimation of value for each parcel of property.23 Under Ohio law
the county auditor is the public official charged with the estimation of
the value of all real property in his specific county for purposes of taxa-
'" "Tax bill" as used herein refers to the amount of tax due from an individual.
This is not to be confused with House Bill 920, which is a taxing statute.
18 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5701.02 (Page 1980).
18 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS PROPERTY ASSESS-
MENT VALUATION 12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as IAAOJ. For the detailed
statutory definitions of personal property, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5711.01
(Page 1980), and § 5709.01 and § 5709.02 as cited therein.
'0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5711 (Page 1980) governs the taxation of personal
property.
2" O. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE 137
(1974) [hereinafter cited as OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE].
' IAAO, supra note 19, at 5. See also OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE, supra note 21,
at 244.
' OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE, supra note 21, at 243.
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tion.1 In establishing the value of any piece of real property the county
auditor is subject to statutory provisions25 as well as rules of the Com-
missioner of Tax Equalization."6 His first duty under statutory law is to
appraise the property, that is, to establish its "true value in money.."1
7
The administrative rule of the Department of Tax Equalization has pro-
vided assistance by further defining the meaning of "true value in
money" as: 1) the price for which the property could be sold in an arm's
length sale between a willing seller and willing buyer within a reason-
able length of time either before or after the tax lien date, presuming no
loss in value due to some casualty subsequent to the sale;28 or 2) the
price at which the property should sell in an arm's length sale between
a willing buyer and willing seller, both under no compulsion to buy or
sell and both understanding all the relevant facts. 9 As an elemental
first step, the county auditor appraises the property in his county at the
value for which it has recently sold or would sell in an arm's length
transaction.
After the appraised or "market" value of the real property has been
established, the county auditor must then establish the taxable value of
the property. This process is known as "assessing" value. The assessed
value may equal 100% or less of the established market value.2 Ohio
law and the rules of the Department of Tax Equalization currently pro-
vide that the assessed value of all real property shall be equal to 35% of
its true value." This assessed value then forms the base upon which the
property taxes will be levied.
24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.01 (Page 1980).
2 Id. §§ 5713, 5715.
26 Id. H.B. 920 of the 111th General Assembly created the Department of Tax
Equalization with an appointed commissioner as administrator. It is his duty to
direct and supervise the assessment of all real property for taxation. 1976 OHIO
LAWS 3182.
27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.01 (Page 1981).
21 OHIO AD. CODE 5705-3-01 (Nov. 1, 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.03
(Page 1980).
9 OHIO AD. CODE 5705-3-01 (Nov. 1, 1977). The rules essentially reflect the
Supreme Court's ruling in State, ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals,
175 Ohio St. 410, 412, 195 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1964).
1 IAAO, supra note 19, at 4. Oldman and Schoettle state that throughout the
United States the practice, sometimes sanctioned by statute or constitution, has
been to use only a percentage of the fair market value of a property as its assessed
value. OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE, supra note 21, at 244.
The word "assessment" is sometimes used to describe the process of appraisal
even though the words are not synonomous. A possible explanation may be found
in the fact that in some states the assessed value equals the appraised or market
value, hence providing no dollar difference in the two values. Technically,
however, the distinction between appraisal and assessment should be maintained.
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.03 (Page 1980); OHIO AD. CODE 5705-3-02 (Nov.
1. 1977).
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The second essential element of the Ohio property tax bill is the tax
rate. The tax rate for property tax bills is generally expressed in one of
three ways: as millage (e.g., 50 mills), as dollars per $100 of assessed
value (e.g., $5.00 per $100), or as dollars per $1,000 of assessed value
(e.g., $50.00 per $1,000 of assessed value).2 In Ohio, the tax rate is
generally expressed in mills (thousandths of a dollar) and dollars per
$100 of assessed value. 3 The tax rate used to determine the property
tax due on the Ohio real property tax bill is generally referred to in
mills rounded to the nearest tenth34 and is an aggregate of all the in-
dividual tax rates levied on a particular property by the authorized
governmental units, such as the county, city, township, school or
library. 5
In order to understand the complexities of the Ohio real property tax
bill and the effect that the tax reform measure H.B. 920 has had on this
tax bill, it is essential to analyze the distinction which Ohio law has cur-
rently established in regard to the specific categories of property tax
millage. Ohio law provides that tax levies3" be divided into five
categories. 7 The five categories may be grouped as to levies "within the
ten-mill limitation" or "in excess of the ten-mill limitation."3
The levies within the ten-mill limitation refer to those levies authorized
by Article XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution which states in pertinent
part:
No property taxed according to value, shall be so taxed in ex-
cess of one percent of its true value 39 in money for all state and
local purposes, but laws may be passed authorizing additional
taxes to be levied outside of such limitation, either when ap-
proved by at least a majority of the electors of the taxing dis-
trict voting on such proposition, or when provided for by the
charter of a municipal corporation.
The millage levied within the ten-mill limitation is commonly referred to
as "inside millage" since it is levied "inside of" or "within the authority
of" the Constitutional ten-mill limitation. It is also sometimes described
as "unvoted" millage, since it is levied without specific voter approval.
"2 IAAO, supra note 19, at 6.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5705.02, 5705.25 (Page 1980).
3' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.33 (Page 1953).
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5705.01, 5705.03 (Page 1980).
3 "Levy," as used in this context, refers to the total sum to be raised by a
specific tax for a specific purpose. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (4th ed.
1972). The word is also generally used to represent the total sum to be raised
from all charges for whatever purpose. It therefore may be used to describe both
the whole tax collection and the various parts of the collection.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.04 (Page 1980).
38 Id.
" "One percent of true value" equals ten mills of true value.
'0 OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2.
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Ohio statutory law has further clarified and modified this constitutionally
authorized millage by providing that: 1) the ten-mill limit is an ag-
gregate amount which may be levied by all governmental units properly
empowered to levy a tax on any taxable parcel of property; and 2) it is
to be levied on the "taxable value," not "true value."' 1
The levies "in excess of the ten-mill limitation" refer to those levies
which have been authorized for a specific purpose by a vote of the elec-
torate in accordance with and under the authority of the applicable
statutes. 2 It is common to refer to these levies as "voted levies" or "out-
side millage" in distinction to the "unvoted levies" or "inside" millage
discussed above. Over the last few decades, this voter-approved millage
was and still is the primary subject of various property tax relief
statutes. 3 A large part, if not the majority, of the millage levied on the
average parcel of property in Cuyahoga County is within this category
of voted millage." Consequently, it would seem to be a logical target for
tax relief legislation.
There remains a third and final class of millage which must be reviewed
separately from the previous two categories of "inside" and "outside"
millage. This group consists of those levies authorized by the charter of
a municipal corporation and commonly referred to as "charter millage."
Charter millage is a hybrid, that is, it possesses characteristics similar
to both "inside" and "outside" millage.
Because charter millage may be levied with only legislative (city coun-
cil) approval, it is similar to the "inside" millage discussed above. Yet, it
is also akin to "outside" millage because it must have been approved by
the voters as part of the municipal charter. Once approved, it becomes
permanent until altered by further charter amendment. Charter millage
has its origin in the Ohio Constitution which has granted to all
municipalities the "authority to exercise all powers of local self-
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.02 (Page 1980). For example, the constitu-
tionally authorized ten mills may be allocated: 1.50 mills to the county; 4.10 mills
to the school district; and 4.40 mills to the city. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.31(D)
(Page 1980), guarantees a minimum levy within the ten-mill limitation to each
governmental unit which qualifies under its provisions.
42 General authorization for levies in excess of the ten-mill limitation is found
in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.07 (Page 1980). Enumeration of the various
specific tax levies can be found in OHIo REV. CODE ANN § 5705.19 through
§ 5705.261 (Page 1980).
" See note 99 infra and accompanying text; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.11
(Page 1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301 (Page Supp. 1977). H.B. 920 enacted
§ 319.301, while repealing § 5713.11. See note 2 supra.
" DTE Form No. 27, Tax Rates for Cuyahoga County for the Tax Year 1979,
distinguishes each tax levy according to its groups. A simple average indicates
that 68.6 mills are levied on the average parcel of real property. Of this, an
average 51.3 mills, or 74.8%, are voted levies.
[Vol. 30:137
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government"45 and the right to "frame and adopt or amend a charter for
its self-goverment."46 Standing alone, these constitutional provisions do
not give a municipality without a charter the authority to levy outside
millage as "charter" millage or to levy as "charter" millage additional
millage which would be violative of the general law. Nor do these con-
stitutional provisions permit a city which has adopted a charter without
explicit provisions for a property tax levy to be free from the limita-
tions of the general law in levying taxes48 in the name of "charter"
millage. Rather, "charter" millage must be seen as that millage explicit-
ly contained in, authorized and limited by a duly adopted municipal
charter.49 To illustrate, a charter city is exempted from the general tax
limitations'0 only if a limitation of taxes for all purposes or for current
operating expenses is explicitly provided for in the charter."1 Therefore,
in addition to the five categories of property tax millage set out in Ohio
law,52 which have been grouped into "inside" (unvoted) and "outside"
(voted) millage, "charter" millage, as distinguished above, must also be
considered as a separate type of millage. This distinction will become
more important as the problem of tax relief and H.B. 920 is further
analyzed.
In Ohio, the taxable value multiplied by the aggregate gross tax rate53
is the beginning of the process of calculating the tax bill. 5' The result of
this mathematical process is the "gross tax," which currently is
significantly larger than the final property tax liability.
55
'5 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
46 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7.
" Section seven of Article XVIII, while providing for the adoption of a
municipal charter, makes the charter subject to Section three of the same article,
which provides that the exercise of the powers of local self-government may not
be in conflict with the general law. Additionally, § 13 of Art. XVIII, whose sub-
mission and passage was synchronous with the above two provisions, explicitly
provides that laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy
taxes. See also State, ex rel. Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 119 N.E. 253 (1917).
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 3, 7.
4 For the method of adopting a municipal charter, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 705 (Page 1976).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.18 (Page 1980), which is consistent with
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 13.
" State, ex reL Thomas v. Heuck, 49 Ohio App. 436, 197 N.E. 376 (1934). As
will be seen, charter millage also enjoys an exemption from the tax relief provi-
sions of H.B. 920.
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.04 (Page 1980).
1 The aggregate gross tax rate refers to the sum total of all tax levies charged
by any governmental agency which has authority to levy a tax on a piece of prop-
erty, which sum total is taken prior to the effect of any credits which may reduce
the tax bill.
I For a step-by-step outline of calculation of a tax bill, see Appendix A.
55 1&
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Once gross tax is determined, the law provides for the deduction of
certain credits to yield the net current property tax58 or tax owed by the
property owner. These credits may be enumerated as follows: 1) the
H.B. 920 credit; 7 2) the ten percent rollback credit; 58 3) the two and a
half percent residential rollback credit;59 and 4) the homestead exemp-
tion credit."
The H.B. 920 credit is the first reduction applied to the gross current
tax." To defer an in-depth analysis of the credit and its calculation at
this point, it is enough to say that the H.B. 920 credit comprises a reduc-
tion of the gross tax, the amount of which is calculated as a percentage
of the gross tax. The percentage of the H.B. 920 credit is previously
determined and certified to the county auditor by the Commissioner of
Tax Equalization.2
The second reduction is a ten percent reduction to be calculated on
the adjusted gross tax due after the application of the H.B. 920 credit,
but prior to the reduction from any further tax credits. 3 The reduction
is commonly referred to as the "ten percent rollback" and is applied to
every Ohio real property tax bill. It should be noted, however, that the
amount credited against the tax bill under this provision is not lost
revenue to the governmental units, but is refunded to the local govern-
ments from the state's general fund.'
The third credit, a two and one-half percent rollback, is applied only
to owner-occupied residential property."5 Like the ten percent rollback,
the amount of reduction is refunded to the local governments upon the
county auditor's certification of the rollback credit's amount to the state
auditor." While referred to as a two and one-half percent reduction, the
amount deducted from the bill will equal two and one-half percent of the
adjusted gross tax due after the H.B. 920 reduction or, as the statute ac-
I This article will omit comment on the addition of delinquent taxes and
special assessments (charges for a specific municipal service placed only on those
properties which benefit from the service) to the tax bill since they are added
after the current tax liability has been calculated.
See notes 61-62 infra.
See notes 63-64 infra.
See note 65 infra.
8 See note 70 infra.
8, 1976 OHIo LAws 3194 (1976). The H.B. 920 credit was the major tax relief
portion of the bill. See Appendix A for an example of this reduction.
62 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A)(1), (2) (Page Supp. 1977).
Id. § 319.301(B) (Page Supp. 1977).
Id. § 321.24(F).
65 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 323.152(B) (Page Supp. 1979).
Id. § 323.153(B) (Page Supp. 1977). This provision makes it similar to the
"Homestead Exemption," which will be discussed next, and explains the reason
for the 2 1/2% reduction being incorporated as part of the same statutory section
as the "Homestead Reduction."
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tually states, "one-fourth of the amount by which the taxes charged and
payable on the homestead are reduced" under the ten percent rollback."
Unlike the two previous tax credits, both of which are automatically ex-
tended to every real property tax bill, the two and one-half percent tax
reduction is extended only to those homesteads for which the owner
receives a certificate of reduction from the county auditor."
The last credit on the real property tax bill is the Homestead Exemp-
tion. Article XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution was amended to provide
that laws may be passed to reduce taxes by providing for a reduction in
value of the homesteads of permanently and totally disabled residents
and residents sixty-five years of age and older, and providing for income
and other qualifications to obtain such reduction. 9 By November, 1975,
laws had been passed to enact the homestead exemption for those quali-
fying residents, although the exemption did not appear on the tax bill
until December of 1976.0 The law provided that the amount of the tax
exemption would be computed "by multiplying the tax rate for the tax
year for which the certificate [of eligibility] is issued by the reduction in
taxable value."" The amount of taxable value used to compute the
reduction was to be determined by a statutory table which paralleled
various income levels with the amount of the value reduction to be
allowed."2 After the reduction in tax dollars has been calculated, it is
deducted from the tax bill, with the amount remaining representing the
net current general taxes due from the taxpayer. This reduction, as
with the two previous rollbacks, is also refunded to the local govern-
ments by the state.13
67 I& § 323.152(B) (Page Supp. 1979). David Swetland, of the Park Investment
Company, challenged the constitutionality of this credit in State, ex reL Swetland
v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, April 2, 1980). His principal argument was
that such a rollback violated Section two of Article XII of the Ohio Constitution.
However, on April 2, 1980, the Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, ruled
that the 2 1/20 credit for homesteads was constitutional. The effect of what may
now be termed Park Investment V will be examined later in this article.
66 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 323.152(B) (Page Supp. 1979). This credit was the
compromise result of a battle in the Ohio Senate over more substantial tax
reform proposals. See The Plain Dealer, Sept. 28, 1979 at 6-A, col. 3-4. In the opi-
nion of the editorial staff of Ohio's largest paper, however, it was not only "too
little, too late," but also the creator of a great deal of additional administrative
paperwork for the county auditor. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 25, 1979 at 12-A, col.
1-2.
69 1975 OHIO LAWS 50.
70 Id S.B. 24, which enacted § 323.151 through § 323.157 of the Ohio Revised
Code, became effective November 7, 1975. For the details of the qualifications
and filing requirements, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 323.151-.157 (Page Supp.
1979).
7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 323.152 (Page Supp. 1979).
71 Id. The income limitations were increased in 1979 effective for the 1980 tax
collection. See 1979 OHIO LAWS 5-55.
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 323.156 (Page Supp. 1979).
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The above analysis has outlined all the steps used to compute the tax-
payer's net current general tax liability. While there may be some fur-
ther miscellaneous charges on the tax bill, these are beyond the scope of
this article. 4 All possible charges are, however, included on the sample
tax bill in Appendix A. The subsequent analysis of H.B. 920 and property
tax reform will presume a clear understanding of the above, especially
the distinction in property tax levies.
B. House Bill 920
1. A Response to Park Investment
This Note will now proceed with an in-depth analysis of H.B. 920 as a
property tax reform measure. At the outset, a review of the historical
and political setting that led to the passage of H.B. 920 is necessary. The
tax relief aspects of the bill will then be analyzed and the conclusion will
demonstrate the effects of H.B. 920 from both a hypothetical example
and from the actual situation in Cuyahoga County.
If H.B. 920 is to be understood and appreciated as a tax reform
measure, it must be viewed both historically and politically as the prox-
imate result of a continuing series of real property taxation cases which
primarily involved the Park Investment Company. 5 While the decisions
of the Ohio Supreme Court in the Park Investment cases centered
around the twin principles of mandatory market valuation and uniform
percentage assessment,"6 the economic impact of these decisions would
be acutely measured through increased taxes upon both agricultural and
residential property owners." In reviewing the Park Investment cases
the immediate focus will be the "grass roots" effect of the judicial deci-
sions on the agricultural and residential taxpayers rather than the lofty
legal and constitutional principles also established by the cases. These
latter effects will be subject to their own analysis later as a part of this
Note's constitutional critique of H.B. 920.
7' See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
7 State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195
N.E.2d 908 (1964); State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 16 Ohio St.
2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968); State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 26
Ohio St. 2d 161, 270 N.E.2d 342 (1971); State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax
Appeals, 32 Ohio St. 2d 28, 289 N.E.2d 579 (1972). See also State, ex reL Park Inv.
Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 1 Ohio St. 2d 171, 205 N.E.2d 578 (1974), in which plain-
tiff requested the B.T.A. to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of
the court's original decision. This case may be considered part of Park Invest-
ment .
6 Finnarn, Property Taxes and Farmers in Ohio: The Park Investment Story,
7 TOL. L. REV. 1125, 1127 n.14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Finnarn].
" Since the two essential variables of the tax bill are value and rate, any in-
crease in value will produce a corresponding increase in taxes unless there is
some form of tax relief, such as H.B. 920.
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In 1964, the Park Investment Company of Cleveland brought a man-
damus action against the Board of Tax Appeals (B.T.A.)8 in the Ohio
Supreme Court."9 The Park Investment Company sought an order to
direct the B.T.A. to make a determination "that the real property in
Cuyahoga County has not been and is not being assessed by an equal
and uniform rule according to true value in money,"' and to also direct
the B.T.A. "to issue orders to the Auditor of Cuyahoga County to
decrease the aggregate assessed value of 'commercial' real property in
Cuyahoga County."'" The Park Investment Company argued from statis-
tical records of real estate transactions that the assessed valuation of
commercial property in Cuyahoga County was a greater percentage of
its sales price than real estate in other classifications.2 The B.T.A. con-
tended that sales price was not the only factor determinative of real
estate value and that, standing alone, it was inconclusive of true value.'
While the court did treat the question of true value quite extensively in
its majority opinion,84 it held that the percentage of full value which is
the basis of taxation "must be relatively uniform not only throughout
the state, but also to the various classes of real property."85 In other
words, all property, regardless of class, must now be assessed on the
basis of the same uniform percentage of actual value.8 Consequently,
the court ordered the B.T.A. to review the tax assessments in Cuyahoga
County, and where "it finds that discrepancies exist in the tax
assessments, as a whole or among the various classes of property, to ...
equalize such assessments."87
78 The Board of Tax Appeals (B.T.A.), a division of the Department of Taxa-
tion, had, at the time of the action, both quasi-judicial and administrative duties.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5703.02-.13 (Page 1973). Certain administrative duties of
the B.T.A. were later assumed by the Department of Tax Equalization upon its
creation by H.B. 920. See notes 2, 27 supra.
7 State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 197 Ohio St. 410, 195
N.E.2d 908 (1964). This case is commonly known as Park Investment L
80 Id.
81 1d.
82 Id. at 411, 195 N.E.2d at 909. Real estate valuations are currently reported
to the Department of Tax Equalization on DTE Form No. 93 (Rev. March 1977),
under the following classes: Residential, Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural and
Mineral Rights. Public Utility real estate valuations are reported separately
from the above.
831
84 Id at 412, 195 N.E.2d at 910.
85 Id. at 413, 195 N.E.2d at 911.
8 Id.
87 Id. at 414, 195 N.E.2d at 911. In allowing the writ of mandamus, the court
did not rule that discrepancies in tax assessments existed, but merely ordered
the B.T.A. to conduct a review to determine the facts. If discrepancies existed,
then the board was to order the county auditor to equalize them. In a related
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Such a ruling, at least initially and superficially, should hardly have
been a matter of concern for the farmer and homeowner, who at this
time were generally assessed at a lower percentage of true value than
their commercial counterparts.88 Park Investment Company was merely
demanding a decrease in its own assessed valuation which, if granted,
would lower the taxes for the company. However, the other side of the
"tax equalization" coin, while not specifically requested as a remedy
was, nevertheless, possible. Equalization in assessment could be achieved
by increasing the assessed values of those classes allegedly lower than
the commercial class of which Park Investment Company seemed repre-
sentative, or by both decreasing the assessment level of commercial
property and increasing the assessment level of residential and agricul-
tural property to a common level somewhere between the two levels.
While either of these alternatives would have the effect of increasing
the property taxes of the farmer and homeowner, there was no signifi-
cant reaction from either group following the court's decision.
In 1968, the Park Investment Company was again before the Ohio
Supreme Court with a mandamus action to require B.T.A. to assess all
real property uniformly on a statewide basis.89 It alleged that the B.T.A.
failed to perform its duty under the Ohio statutes and under the Con-
stitutions of the state of Ohio and the United States." It based its claim
of discriminatory assessment on a 1962 sales ratio study91 that indicated
a statewide average sales ratio of 38.78%, while a similar 1965 study for
Cuyahoga County produced a sales ratio of 48.65% for commercial prop-
erty." The realtor was thus attempting to secure a further tax reduc-
tion based primarily on the lower statewide common level of assess-
ment. Up to this point, the B.T.A. had not addressed the question of
statewide uniformity. The court held in a unanimous per curiam opinion
that it is the duty of the B.T.A. to see that all real property within the
case the next year, the court dismissed a motion on the part of Park Investment
Company to show cause why the board should not be held in contempt of the high
court's first order. Park Investment alleged that the board failed to obey the
order when it ordered the Cuyahoga County Auditor to reduce the assessed
value of all commercial and industrial property by 15%. It was the relator's con-
tention that the valuation according to uniform rule is applicable to the individual
parcel of property as well as to the aggregate. State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd.
of Tax Appeals, 1 Ohio St. 2d at 173, 205 N.E.2d at 580 (1965).
Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1131.
State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 16 Ohio St. 2d 85, 242
N.E.2d 887 (1968). This case is commonly known as Park Investment II.
90 Id.
91 The sales ratio is the ratio of the taxable value to a recent sale value, taken
as indicative of true value.
' 16 Ohio St. 2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968). In reality, Park Investment Com-
pany's own property at that time was being assessed at 42.9 0 , which was near
the 1963 prevailing common level of assessment for all real property in Cuyahoga
County. See Kobling v. Bd. of Revision, 5 Ohio St. 2d 214, 215 N.E. 2d 384 (1966).
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State of Ohio is assessed at a uniform percentage of its true value in
money.93 The opinion, however, gave the B.T.A. no practical guidance on
how it was to implement the order for statewide uniformity.
Finally, in March of 1969, the B.T.A. proposed Rule 100,1" which would
fix the assessment level of all property in the state between 38% and
42% after a public hearing. It was at this juncture that Ohio's farmers
took notice of the issue; it was one thing to lower the assessment of com-
mercial property, but quite another to adjust all classes to a statewide
common level of assessment. Most farmers would be subject to con-
siderable tax increases if their assessed values were increased.95 This
would generally be the case because agricultural property had, for the
most part, been assessed previously below the 40% figure contained in
the B.T.A.'s proposed rule." Likewise, residential property owners and
groups concerned about the loss of tax revenue from commercial and in-
dustrial properties addressed themselves to the issue. 7 This should not
have been surprising because Ohioans, especially rural property owners,
were used to voting on tax increases,98 and would oppose the unvoted
tax increases which the Park Investment decisions would effect. This
opposition existed in spite of some limited tax relief which had been
available through millage reductions in certain situations when valua-
tions or assessments were increased.9
" 16 Ohio St. 2d at 87, 242 N.E.2d at 889. For further comment on the quality
and legal analysis in the high court's opinion, see Finnarn, supra note 76, at
1159-64.
" See Note, Real Property Assessments in Ohio, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 840, 846-47
(1969).
" Summarizing the formula for taxes in an example:
Assessed Value x Tax Rates = Tax Due
$10,000 $50/$1000 $500
$12,000 $50/$1000 $600
" Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1165.
7 Id at 1168.
" Id. at 1167.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.11, as amended, OHIO REV. CODE ANN §
5713.11 (Page Supp. 1975). Finnarn summarizes this tax relief as follows:
This law provided for a reduction in "voted" tax millage in the same pro-
portion in which the total valuation of property in a taxing district was
increased by "certain" reassessments or reappraisals over the total
valuation of the year preceding the reassessment or reappraisal. In most
cases, the reduction would not apply to that part of an increase stem-
ming from actual noninflationary improvements added to the tax dupli-
cate. The key feature of the law .... [is] that it only applies to "voted" or
"outside" tax millage (there were other exemptions at one time or
another) and thus it will not work to reduce the levy of "unvoted" or "in-
side" millage which is limited by the Ohio Constitution to 1% (10 mills)
of a property's true value in money. Ohio Constitution, Article XII, Sec-
tion 2.
The application of the millage reduction law is demonstrated in the
1981]
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The legislative response to the growing controversy and grass roots
opposition came in the form of Senate Bill 199 (S.B. 199),1 ° enacted as an
emergency measure to take effect May 14, 1969,1' by legislators who
were beginning to hear from their various constituents."°2 Senate Bill
199 amended sections 5715.01 and 5715.24 of the Revised Code, to delay
until 1972 and thereafter the power of the B.T.A. to issue rules concern-
ing the taxable value of real property and the percentage to be applied
in such determination and to determine whether the real property and
various classes thereof have been assessed by an equal and uniform
rule."3 In essence, the legislature had effectively removed the statutory
foundation of the Park Investment H decision and had delayed any tax
increases.
This legislative tactic immediately triggered Park Investment III, in
which the company filed a motion1 4 for the Supreme Court to order the
B.T.A. to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of its statu-
tory and Constitutional duties required by Park Investment II. Stripped
of the legal arguments, the court, in a unanimous opinion, held that inso-
far as S.B. 199 purported to delay the B.T.A. from carrying out its duties
as reported in Park Investment H, it was in conflict with Article XII,
following example. A farm valued for tax purposes at $21,000 is reas-
sessed (for a certain reason) at $28,000. The tax millage applicable to the
farm before the change in tax value was 20 mills, made up of 10 unvoted
and 10 voted mills. Assuming that the reassessment is one that qualifies
under the section, the "outside" millage will be rolled back in proportion
to the increase in tax attributable to it. In other words, since the total
tax on the farm before reassessment was $21,000 x .020 = $420 ($210 at-
tributable to the inside millage, $210 attributable to the outside millage),
the total tax on the farm after reassessment will be $28,000 x .0175 (the
reduced millage) = $490 ($280 attributable to the inside millage, the
same $210 attributable to the outside millage).
The initial purpose of the law was to allow for reductions in voted
millage in proportion to the inflationary increases of taxpayers' property
as measured in a county's sexennial reappraisal. With the advent of the
Park Investment case, however, the millage rollback mechanism soon
became a battleground in regard to what type of readjustment in tax-
able value (whether stemming from a B.T.A. uniform assessment order
or from an actual change in the true value of property) should trigger
the reduction. As amended in 1975, the section was made applicable to
increases "for any reason other than the addition of improvements to
the tax list." Ohio Revised Code Ann. Section 5713.11, Page Supp. 1975.
Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1166-67 n.265.
10 1969 OHIo LAWS 648.
101 1969 OHIo LAWS 648, 651.
102 Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1168.
10 1969 OHio LAWS 649, 651.
104 State, ex rel Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 26 Ohio St. 2d at 162, 270
N.E.2d at 342 (1971) (Commonly known as Park Investment III).
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§ 2 of the Ohio Constitution and was therefore invalid.0 5 However, the
court also held that the B.T.A., believing in good faith that S.B. 199 had
rendered it powerless to act, was not in contempt of court.' 8
In response to Park Investment III, the B.T.A. adopted and pro-
mulgated new rules in December, 1971, calling for all real property in
Ohio to be placed on the 1972 tax duplicate at the rate of 35% of its cur-
rent market value."7 This presented a two-tiered tax increase for most
agricultural and residential property owners, for not only would the tax-
able value of their property have to be increased to bring them to an
assessment level of 35% of market value, but also their property was to
be reappraised to its current market value."8 Farmers and friends, in-
cluding many County Auditors, 9 turned to the General Assembly for
relief. The General Assembly responded sympathetically with the
passage of Amended Substitute Senate Bill 455 (S.B. 455),11 which pro-
vided for the staggered implementation of the statewide uniform assess-
ment to occur whenever the county underwent its sexennial reappraisal
between 1972 and 1977."' It also provided that the B.T.A. rules for
determining the true value of real property take into account the prop-
erty's "current use without regard to neighborhood land use of a more
intensive nature.""... The legislature's continued willingness to attempt
to prevent any major shift in the tax burden which would surely have
occurred had the 1975 B.T.A. rules been implemented is striking.
Park Investment IV was to arise directly from the B.T.A.'s accep-
tance of the mandates of S.B. 455."' The Park Investment Company filed
105 Id at 166, 270 N.E.2d at 345. Although hearings were held in the summer
of 1969, no decision was reached until June, 1971, with the B.T.A. holding all ac-
tion in abeyance.
10 Id. at 168, 270 N.E.2d at 347.
'o7 The substance of the rules can be found in State, ex rel Park Inv. Co. v.
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 32 Ohio St. 2d 28, 29, 289 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1972).
108 Prior to this, the Board of Tax Appeals had proposed that the market value
concept emanating from Park Investment I and II be applied only in a county's
year of sexennial reappraisal. See Note, Real Property Assessments in Ohio, 30
OHIO ST. L.J. 840, 846 n.28 (1969).
" Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1173. Since many county auditors had recently
completed sexennial reappraisals for their county based on the B.T.A. rules as
modified after Park Investment I, they were not anxious to undergo another
rather costly reappraisal and reassessment in 1972.
110 1972 OHIO LAWS 859.
"' 1972 OHIO LAWS 867-68.
112 I& at 868. This language was amended in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.01
(Page 1973).
"I On July 3, 1972, the board had applied to the Ohio Supreme Court for fur-
ther instructions on its duties in light of the conflicts presented in S.B. 455, namely,
the staggered implementation of statewide uniform assessment and the con-
sideration of "current use" in determining true value. The request was denied, as
1981]
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a motion requiring the B.T.A. to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt of the high court's mandamus in Park Investment 11. The
court denied the show cause order and upheld the staggered imple-
mentation of statewide uniform assessment as the "fairest and most
equitable procedure."'..4 The court did, however, strike down the "cur-
rent use" method of valuation as being inconsistent with the determina-
tions in Park Investment I and in conflict with the Ohio Constitution."5
While Park Investment IV did not overturn the basic principles of Park
Investment I, it can be seen as the first "retrenchment" by the Ohio
high court. The legislature was finally able to secure the court's im-
primatur on its attempt to determine the precise procedure for im-
plementing the substantive principles of prior Park Investment cases.
For the rural property owners around the state who still feared large
tax increases, it provided much needed additional time to work on fur-
ther legislative changes.
With Ohio farmers generally having the most significant exposure to
property tax increases under the Park Investment mandates,1 ' it was
not surprising that further change came first in the form of a proposed
constitutional amendment on farm land valuation adopted June 13,
1973." ' The proposed amendment provided that agricultural land be
valued at its use for farming, which the farmers understood to be its in-
come producing ability."' The amendment was approved by more than a
three to one margin in November of 1973, amending Article II, § 36 of the
Ohio Constitution. 9 However, the legislation which was subsequently
passed 2 ' to implement the agricultural use valuation proved severely
restrictive, if not useless, to the majority of the state's farmers. 2 ' Con-
cited in Park Investment IV. State, ex reL Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 32
Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 289 N.E.2d 579, 580-81 (1972).
"' Id at 32, 289 N.E.2d at 582.
115 Id at 33, 289 N.E.2d at 582.
116 Agricultural property was generally assessed at a percentage below even
residential property. See, e.g., State, ex reL Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. v. Tax Ap-
peals, 32 Ohio St. 2d at 30, 289 N.E.2d at 580-81. Likewise, farmlands were prov-
ing to be an excellent investment, thus attracting much speculation buying. See
Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1181 n.356. See also Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1179
n.345 (estimated tax increases to farmers).
"1 1973 OHIo LAWS 2043.
"1 Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1181.
"19 Vote: "Yes"-1,796,426; "No"-565,950. OHio REV. CODE ANN., OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 36 (Page Supp. 1977).
"2 1974 OHIo LAWS 135, part 2, at 341.
121 Finnarn offers these comments:
Ohio's agricultural use valuation law ... [was] limited in its operation to
providing tax relief primarily to property owners situated on the urban
fringes of the state's rapidly growing cities, where farmland had tradi-
tionally been gobbled up and converted to nonagricultural uses. Farmers
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sequently, in 1975, a large number of rural counties undergoing reap-
praisal along with those counties under annual redetermination 2 ex-
perienced unusually large tax increases 113 when the tax bills were
received in late 1975 and early 1976. At this time, residential taxpayers
as well were becoming disgruntled124 and readily joined what was
becoming the "tax revolt of 1976. ' 2
The legislation that was to emerge as the response to angry tax-
payers trying to lessen the impact of Park Investment and stop "un-
voted" tax increases was H.B. 920.12' The essence of H.B. 920, as in-
troduced,2 7 was to restore property taxes on a statewide basis to their
pre-Park Investment sexennial reappraisal level by means of a tax
credit on the tax bills received in 1977. Thereafter, the credit
mechanism would work to keep taxes fairly constant even though
market values continued to increase.2" The bill, in its original form, met
significant resistance from business since it repealed the existent
millage rollback provision of Ohio law" 9 which benefitted businesses
considerably by reducing taxes on their personal property. The business
interests, however, were able to obtain as part of the final version of
in strictly rural areas of the state, on the other hand, were unable to
utilize the new law that they had actively supported.
Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1185.
12 The Board of Tax Appeals (B.T.A.) originally instituted annual re-
determinations in December, 1971, under B.T.A. R. 5-01(B), later to be found in
B.T.A. R. 5-02 (December, 1973). Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1166 n.264. The
Department of Tax Equalization, which assumed the B.T.A's administrative func-
tions under H.B. 920, replaced this annual redetermination with a triennial up-
date in D.T.E. R. 5705-3-02 in November, 1977; HB. 920 gave the Commissioner of
Tax Equalization authority to order a reassessment only in the third calendar
year following the year in which a sexennial reappraisal was complete. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5715.33 (Page 1980).
" Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1186-87 n.387.
" In Cuyahoga County, the effect of the Park Investment reappraisal was
estimated at a $30 million tax burden shift from industry to homeowners. Fin-
narn, supra note 76, at 1189.
125 For a more detailed description of the events surrounding the "tax revolt,"
see Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1186-94.
"u After a proposal by Ohio Governor James Rhodes in December, 1975, the
B.T.A. voted to freeze values at their January 1, 1975 levels, on January 28, 1976.
H.B. 920 then emerged as the tax reform measure to confront the problem of in-
creased taxes caused by Park Investment. Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1189-90.
127 1976 OHIO LAWS 3182. It is interesting to note that its sponsor was State
Representative John Johnson, Chairman of the House Agriculture and Natural
Resources Committee. Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1190.
12" Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1190-91. The initial provision, later repealed by
amendment, to make "inside millage" subject to the credit mechanism, was essen-
tial to keep taxes uniformly constant. "Inside millage" was also previously excluded
from the millage rollback provisions of § 5713.11. See note 97 supra.
'" See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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H.B. 920 a reduction in the assessment level of their personal property
from the 45-50% level to a uniform 35%.130
By the time H.B. 920 was enacted in June 1976, it had been changed
substantially from its original version.1 3' Most significantly, it failed to
provide for the restoration of the pre-Park Investment tax balance."'
More incredibly, it provided a mechanism, albeit unknowingly, to con-
tinue the shift in the tax burden which Park Investment initiated.
2. The Mechanics of the H.B. 920 Tax Credit
The mechanism which the legislature chose to implement property
tax relief in H.B. 920 was a "tax credit" expressed as a percentage by
which tax liability would be reduced. 1 3 The Commissioner of Tax
Equalization, whose department and position were newly created by
H.B. 920,"" was mandated to annually determine
by what percent the sums levied by such tax against real prop-
erty would have to be reduced for the tax to levy the same
number of dollars in the current year, exclusive of sums levied
against improvements added to the tax list since the preceding
tax year, as were charged against all real property in the
district by such tax in the preceeding year ....15
Once the percentage was determined, the commissioner was mandated
to certify such percentage to the county auditor who, in turn, was re-
quired to "reduce the sum to be levied by such tax against each parcel
of real property in the district by the percent so certified."'3 0
In fulfilling his statutorily mandated duty to compute the reduction
factor, the Commissioner of Tax Equalization, in a memo dated August
4, 1976 to all county auditors, authorized provisional Form A137 as the
form on which valuation data was to be submitted and from which the
130 1976 OHIo LAwS 3182. See also Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1192.
"I State Representative John Johnson, the original sponsor of H.B. 920, was
quoted as saying: "The basic guts of 920 were spewed all over the capital and
nothing is left of it." Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1192 n.418.
Id at 1192.
1 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301 (A)(1) (Page Supp. 1977).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.01 (Page 1981).
135 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1977). Any hint of concern
for the residential and agricultural taxpayer's plight after Park Investment
seems absent from the language of the statute. Rather, the intention of the
statute seems directed toward preventing additional dollars from accruing to
local governments. Perhaps the legislature mistakenly thought that the latter
was synonomous with tax relief and protection from unvoted tax increases for
the farmer and homeowner.
Id § 319.301(AX2).
"8 In 1977 the form was permanently identified as DTE Form 115 (A) or (B).
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tax reduction factors would be computed.'38 The form assembled the
data necessary to calculate a reduction factor for each "taxing authority
or district," ie. each governmental district or subdivision authorized to
levy taxes.3 ' The calculation of the tax reduction factor can easily be
demonstrated by the following example using the figures from Appen-
dix B-"Bethlehem Taxing Authority."
1976 Total Taxable less N.I.* $14,631,841
1975 Total Taxable Real 8,433,768
Increase in value $ 6,198,073
Increase in value + 1976 Total Taxable less N.I. = Tax Reduction Factor
$6,198,073 - $14,631,841 = .423602
* New Improvements
A simple example will demonstrate that the application of the tax reduc-
tion factor will insure that the millage levied against real property
would levy the same number of dollars in the current year, exclusive of
sums levied against new improvements,' 4' as were charged against real
property in the district in the preceding year. For the example, a levy of
50 voted mills will be assumed. The proof is then given:
$8,433,768 $14,631,841
x 50 mills($50/$1,000) x 50 mills($50/$1,000)
Gross tax $ 421,688 $ 731,592
H.B. 920 credit -0- - 309,904($731,529 x .423602)
NET TAX $ 421,688 $ 421,688
The preceding example demonstrates that the use of a tax reduction fac-
tor will prevent unvoted tax increases when valuation is increased due
138 Memo to all County Auditors from Robert P. Kinney, Supervisor Real
Estate Equalization Section, regarding § 319.301 (R.C., Tax Reduction Factor,
Aug. 4, 1976). The use of valuations to calculate the reduction factors, rather than
the "sums levied" as stated in the statute, was primarily a time-saving procedure;
it was a mathematically valid short cut since the percent by which the tax dollars
from a constant levy increase is the same percent as the value increase. For ex-
ample:
Value x Rate Tax
Year A $10,000 5 mills = $50
Year B $15,000 5 mills = $75
Percentage Reduction by Statutory Language: ($75-$50) + $75 = 33%
Percentage Reduction under DTE Value Method: ($15,000-$10,000)
$15,000 = 33%
M Since the tax credit was to apply to the "sums levied" by a specific tax levy,
note 35 supra, it follows that the "taxing authority or district" must be
understood to be a "taxing unit" as defined in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5701.01(H)
(Page 1980).
1"0 New improvements refer to structures such as houses or buildings which
were built after the last tax year and are to be taxed in the ensuing year for the
first time.
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to reappraisal or reassessment. The asssumption was made, for sake of
this example, that all of Bethlehem's fifty mills were subject to the tax
credit provision of H.B. 920. In reality this would never be the case
because virtually every taxing unit would levy some millage which was
not subject to the tax credit."' In the final version of H.B. 920, the legis-
lature exempted four kinds of millage from the tax credit mechanism.
The levies were: 1) a tax levied at whatever rate is required to produce
a specified amount of tax money;12 2) an amount to pay debt charges; 3)
taxes levied inside the ten-mill limitation; and 4) taxes authorized by the
charter of a municipal corporation. "3 As a consequence, any increase in
value would produce a corresponding increase in taxes for the above tax
levies unless there was a reduction in the rate of millage.'"
Because the individual property tax bill would include taxes from
both levies subject to the tax credit and levies exempt from the tax
credit, the Commissioner of Tax Equalization, in an unnumbered entry, 5
outlined the steps necessary to calculate a single factor termed "com-
posite tax reduction factor'" by which the individual tax liability must
be reduced to account for the different tax credits and their respective
levies. "' Further analysis of the composite reduction factor will not be
pursued herein since it does not directly affect the scope of this
analysis.
3. The Effect of H.B. 920 on the Various Classes of Taxpayers
Despite what may have initally seemed to be an attempt to freeze
property taxes for the homeowner and farmer, the effect of H.B 920 falls
"' See note 128 supra and accompanying text. A special district, such as a port
authority or community college district, may levy only voted millage, but each city
and school which would tax the same property would levy some "inside millage"
on each tax bill.
142 E.g., A levy under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.194 (Page 1980). This ex-
emption and the exemption of debt charge levies would would not contribute sig-
nificantly to tax increases since the amount of money needed tended to remain
constant, and any upward adjustments to value usually would produce a cor-
responding decrease in tax rate to maintain the same tax revenue.
14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A) (Page Supp. 1977).
1'4 See, e.g., note 95 supra. The only situation in which the individual tax bill
would not reflect an increase would be when the amount of credit from H.B. 920
would be as large or larger than tax increase from levies exempt from the credit.
... Entry dated November 24, 1976, before the Department of Tax Equaliza-
tion, State of Ohio, in the matter of the use and application of the tax reduction
percentage or factor required by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A) (Page Supp.
1977).
146 Id.
"' Appendix C contains the form used by the Cuyahoga County Auditor to
compute this "Composite Reduction Factor."
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far short of that mark. The initial and most evident limitation of H.B.
920 was the exemption of certain levies from the tax credit. A more
serious and less evident limitation of H.B. 920 was born, paradoxically
enough, by the very mechanism that was to provide tax relief, namely
the tax credit. The method of computation and application of the tax
credit was such that the tax credit itself would "shift the burden of tax-
ation" to those classes of property which were experiencing the
severest inflation."'
At this juncture, a detailed example with further explanation would
serve to clearly identify the problem. A cursory review of the form
which the Department of Tax Equalization utilizes as the basis for
calculating the tax credit149 demonstrates that the aggregate property
values reported for both the current year and the prior year are not
distinguished by class, for example, residential, commercial, industrial
or agricultural. 5 ' Rather, they are combined for purposes of the tax
credit computation. Consequently, the tax credit really represents an
"average tax credit" based on the average value increase over all
classes of property. It then becomes a relatively simple matter to
understand that when different classes experience widely varying rates
of value inflation, the "average tax credit" is less representative of the
actual credit which the specific class needs to maintain its parity in
taxes with the previous year.' The class of property with maximum
value inflation would not receive a credit of sufficient amount to pre-
vent tax increases, while the class of property with minimal value infla-
tion would receive a credit of a larger amount, having the effect that its
taxes would actually decrease.
The following example exemplifies this: A hypothetical residential and
commercial property are appraised at $50,000 as of 1978, the taxable
value of each being $17,500.' sz The voted tax rate in 1978 on both proper-
ties is 50 mills. The 1978 property taxes would be calculated at:
Taxable Value Tax Rate Taxes Due
Residential: $17,500 x 50 Mills or ($50/$1,000) = $875
Commercial: $17,500 x 50 Mills or ($50/$1,000) = $875
TOTAL TAXES COLLECTED $1,750
In 1979, the residential property increases 38% to a market value of
"I The Plain Dealer, April 27, 1977 at B-3, col. 3. Cuyahoga County Auditor
Vincent C. Campanella was the first public official to point out this problem with
the law.
'4 See Appendix B.
' See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
'5' For a graphic example of this on a county-wide level, see Appendix D.
152 Tax value equals 35% of market value. See note 31 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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$69,000 and the commercial property increases 15% to a market value
of $57,500,11' with the respective taxable values being $24,150 and
$20,125." The calculation of the H.B. 920 credit would be:15 1
1) Current year total value (Residential
and Commercial) $44,275
less prior year's total value 35,000
Value increase from Reappraisal $ 9,275
2) Value increase + Current year's value = H.B. 920 Credit
$9,275 $44,275 = .209486 (20.9486%)
The 1979 total property taxes would be calculated as follows:
Residential Commercial Total Taxes
Taxable Value $24,150 $20,125
50 mills 50 mills
x Tax Rate ($50/$1,000) ($50/$1,000)
Gross Tax $ 1,208 $ 1,006
Less "920" Credit (.209486) ($ 253) ($ 211)
Net Tax Due $ 955 $ 795 $1,750
Tax increase or decrease (dollars) $80 ($80) -0-
Tax increase or decrease (percent) 9.1% (9.1%) -0-
From the above example a comparison of 1979 property taxes with 1978
property taxes shows the residential property tax increasing $80 and
the commercial property tax decreasing $80, while the total taxes col-
lected from both properties remains unchanged at $1,750. The result is
that the residential taxpayer's increase is directly subsidizing the com-
mercial taxpayer's decrease with the local governmental units enjoying
no tax benefit.
Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella estimated that the
1976 property taxes (collected in late 1976 and 1977) for the commercial
and industrial properties in his county decreased $11.6 million while
homeowners were paying $27.6 million more, due at least partially to
the tax credit "averaging" under H.B. 920.156 Following the county's 1979
valuation update 5 7 the county auditor estimated that of the $32.5 million
1 Hypothetical value increases are representative of actual class increases in
Cuyahoga County for tax year 1979. See notes 11, 13 supra and accompanying
text.
See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 139-40 supra and accompanying text.
1 The Clev. Press, March 9. 1978 at A13, col. 1.
1.. Each county must be reappraised once every six years under Ohio law and
by order of the Commissioner of Tax Equalization. The commissioner may
likewise order a reassessment or update in the third calendar year following the
year in which the sexennial reappraisal is completed, if'he deems such real prop-
erty to be underassessed; such has been the practice to date. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5715.33 (Page 1980).
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increase in his county's residential property taxes, $8.6 million was due
directly from the application of the H.B. 920 credit. s Furthermore, com-
mercial and industrial properties received an estimated $9.1 million
decrease"9 from the application of the H.B. 920 credit in the same year.
The impact of H.B. 920 on both the homeowner and the businessman
is clear. The last point that must be made regarding the effect of this
"tax reform" legislation is that its benefits or penalties will continue to
accrue each year in which the law continues to operate. Because of this
cumulative effect, an immediate reconsideration of the law on both the
legislative and judicial level seems not only equitable, but critical.
III. H.B. 920 AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION
Article XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides in part that "land
and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to
value."1 While this general language has been the subject of much
litigation,' the interpretive Supreme Court decisions in the Park In-
vestment cases have proved to be the landmarks against which many
other cases involving the taxation of real property by uniform rule have
been measured."' When the seemingly inequitable effects of the H.B.
920 tax credit are measured against decisions of Park Investment I
through V, a violation of taxation by uniform rule under Article XII, § 2 of
the Ohio Constitution must be seriously considered, if not admitted. The
salient questions, then, which a legal analysis of Park Investment and
related cases will speak to, are: 1) What is the uniformity demanded under
Article XII, § 2; 2) In what cases had it been violated; and 3) Whether
H.B. 920 is similarly violative of this uniformity.
15 Campanella interview, supra note 12.
's' Id. Businesses estimated net decrease of $5.2 million in total 1979 property
tax resulted from $3.9 million of tax increases on the millage exempt from the
H.B. 920 credit being netted out against the $9.1 million decrease on millage sub-
ject to the H.B. 920 credit. The decrease to commercial and industrial properties
attributed to H.B. 920 does not equal the increase to residential property taxes
because of changes in the tax rates subject to H.B. 920 from 1978 to 1979.
"6 OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
161 See, e.g., Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corp., 144 Ohio St. 529, 60 N.E.2d 82
(1945); State, ex rel Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N.E.2d 684 (1937); State,
ex reL Lampson v. Cook, 44 Ohio App. 501, 185 N.E. 212 (1932).
162 See, e.g., State, ex reL Bd. of Tax Appeals v. Smith, 45 Ohio St. 2d 233, 344
N.E.2d 125 (1976); Grabler Mfg. Co. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St. 2d 75, 330 N.E.2d 924
(1975); Bd. of Educ. v. Fulton Cty. Bdgt. Comm., 41 Ohio St. 2d 147, 324 N.E.2d
566 (1975); State, ex reL Bd. of Tax Appeals v. Smith, 39 Ohio St. 2d 155, 314
N.E.2d 165 (1974); Pennsylvania Ry. v. Porterfield, 16 Ohio St. 2d 136, 243
N.E.2d 87 (1968); Phelps Realty Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 16 Ohio St. 2d 83, 243
N.E.2d 97 (1968); Bd. of Revision v. One Euclid Co., 16 Ohio St. 2d 43, 242 N.E.2d
582 (1968); Bd. of Revision v. Federal Reserve Bank, 16 Ohio St. 2d 42, 242 N.E.2d
571 (1968); Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 13 Ohio St. 2d 59, 233 N.E.2d
594 (1968); Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 7 Ohio St. 2d 139, 218 N.E.2d
1981]
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In Park Investment I, the issue of uniformity in taxation was addressed
in answer to the second of two questions raised in the majority opinion.
That question was put thusly: "[Wlhere it is apparent that real property
in the various classes and counties are being assessed on different
percentages of value, is there a duty on the Board of Tax Appeals to
order such county auditors to equalize such assessments?"'' 3 The court
acknowledged that the practice in the state of Ohio was to assess prop-
erty for taxation at only a percentage of its actual value, and it simul-
taneously affirmed that it is precisely here that the question of unifor-
mity surfaces. It stated that, because property is not assessed on the
basis of full value, the percentage of such value which is the basis of tax-
ation must be relatively uniform not only throughout the state but also
to the various classes of real property. 6 ' The court very pointedly
reasoned:
[Ihf the ratio between sales price and assessed value in general
differs to any appreciable extent, either throughout the state as
a whole or as to various classes of property in particular, then
property is not being taxed by uniform rule as required by Sec-
tion 2, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution.'
It would seem that Park Investment I did attempt to define the Con-
stitutional concept of taxation by uniform rule by agreeing that dis-
crimination in the level of assessment of any class was a violation of tax-
ation by uniform rule. While acknowledging that there was no provision
in the Ohio Constitution for a classification of real property according to
use, 'e7 the pertinent issue the court seemed to be raising was not
whether there was de facto classification of real property and whether
such classification was a per se violation of uniformity, but rather
whether such classifications were the basis for unequal assessment. The
court seemed to explicitly admit the value of property classification in
determining the question of uniform taxation when it accepted the com-
parison of the commercial class of property to the other classifications
723 (1966); Continental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. 2d 224, 215 N.E.2d 400
(1966); Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 5 Ohio St. 2d 220, 215 N.E.2d 388
(1966); Summers v. Bd. of Revision, 5 Ohio St. 2d 219, 215 N.E.2d 198 (1966);
Koblenz v. Bd. of Revision, 5 Ohio St. 2d 214, 215 N.E.2d 384 (1966); see also
Lunkenheimer Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 40 Ohio App. 2d 27, 322 N.E.2d 133 (1974);
Selig v. Bd. of Revision, 21 Ohio App. 2d 157, 231 N.E.2d 479 (1967); Women's
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bd. of Revision, 12 Ohio Misc. 79, 212 N.E.2d 828 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1965).
"' State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 197 Ohio St. 410, 411, 195
N.E.2d 908, 909 (1964).
Id at 413, 195 N.E.2d at 911.
163 Id. (Emphasis added).
We Id.
"I Id at 412, 195 N.E.2d at 910.
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and to the whole as a demonstration of the lack of uniformity.'" This
was further supported by the fact that even Justice Gibson, while not in
agreement with the syllabus, still acknowledged the classifications of
property set up by the B.T.A. in its rules'69 as not per se unreasonable
or unlawful. " '
After Park Investment I it was clear that uniformity of taxation
demanded the assessment of all real property at the same percentage of
true value. It was also clear that property classification per se was not
violative of uniformity and could, in fact, be used to assure that same
uniformity. In Women's Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Board
of Revision,"' the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, in hearing
the appeal of Women's Federal from the Board of Revision on its assessed
valuation,'72 echoed the above Park Investment principles when it stated
that the county-wide and state-wide equalization of taxable valuations
among the various classes of property1 3 was a viable goal.
Park Investment II extended the issue of uniformity in assessments
to "statewide" versus "countywide" uniformity of assessment.' In
upholding certain statutory provisions ' 5 which mandated the B.T.A.
"annually to an equal and uniform rule for assessing real property in the
state of Ohio,"' 76 and by issuing the writ of mandamus to require the
B.T.A. to perform its statutory duties, the court accepted the allega-
tions of the Park Investment Company that the commercial class of real
property in Cuyahoga County has been discriminatorily assessed as a
class on a basis approximately 35% in excess of the common level of all
real property in the state of Ohio and in Cuyahoga County.' The court
Id. at 413, 195 N.E.2d at 911.
30 The classes enumerated are residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural
and vacant lots and tracts. Id. at 418, 195 N.E.2d at 914.
70 See Carney v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 169 Ohio St. at 445, 160 N.E.2d at 475
(1959). The Supreme Court found such rules to be neither unreasonable nor
unlawful. Id.
'"' Women's Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bd. of Revision, 12 Ohio Misc. 79, 212
N.E.2d 828 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1965).
171 Women's Federal requested a reduction on its assessed value (926,530),
which it claimed was 10% above its fair market value (840,000). Id.
173 Id.
114 16 Ohio St. 2d at 88, 242 N.E.2d at 889.
375 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5715.01, 5715.24 (eff. November 5, 19651, as cited
in 16 Ohio St. 2d at 88, 242 N.E.2d at 889.
176 Id
11 Id. at 86, 242 N.E.2d at 888. The allegation that commercial property was
assessed at a level 30% in excess of the common level in the state is apparently
incorrect as the relator cited the 1962 statewide sales ratio percentage at
38.78%, which would have put the assessment level of the commercial class at
68.78% (38.78% + 30%); in fact, the relator asserted that the 1965 sales ratio for
commercial property in Cuyahoga County was 48.65%. Id. at 85, N.E. 2d at 888.
This inconsistency, however, was mainly one of degree, not of fact.
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further ruled that it was the duty of B.T.A. to rectify this so that every
class of real property is listed and valued for taxation by an equal and
uniform rule.' 8
The importance of Park Investment 11, in relation to the uniformity
issue and H.B. 920, rested in its reiteration that a violation of constitu-
tional uniformity with respect to assessment can occur to an individual
class, and this can be demonstrated by sales ratio studies which com-
pare classes to each other and to the statewide average. It also stated
that the B.T.A. has a duty to make adjustments by class to assure
uniformity in assessments. '79
Park Investment III, filed as motion to show cause why the B.T.A.
should not be held in contempt of court for failing to perform its duties
under Park Investment II,8' offered little new analysis with respect to
the uniformity issue. In denying the motion on the basis of the reasoned
good faith of the B.T.A.'s delay,'81 the court did quote extensively from
Park Investment I and II and other related cases182 emphasizing that
each parcel regardless of class must be assessed at the same percentage
of true value. 3
Park Investment IV, filed as a motion to show cause why the B.T.A.
should not be held in contempt of court for failing to perform its con-
stitutional duties as mandated in Park Investment II, also did not con-
tribute any significant developments with respect to the constitutional
issue of uniformity and assessment, other than recognizing that the cor-
rection of past inequities cannot be done immediately due to fiscal con-
straints, especially in the smaller counties. 8 ' The court noted that it is
within the scope of the General Assembly's power to schedule this cor-
rection over a period of time while maintaining the principles of Park
Investment I and II.186
While Park Investment I through IV focused on the valuation side of
the tax bill,'87 in what may be viewed as Park Investment V, 8 the Ohio
178 Id. at 86, 242 N.E.2d at 888.
For a critique of the legal deficiencies of the per curiam opinion, see Fin-
narn, supra note 76, at 1159-64.
' 26 Ohio St. 2d at 162, 270 N.E.2d at 342 (1971).
'8' See notes 104, 105 supra and accompanying text.
182 E.g., Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 13 Ohio St. 2d 59, 233 N.E.2d
594 (1968); Koblenz v. Bd. of Revision, 5 Ohio St. 2d 214, 215 N.E.2d 384 (1966);
Goldberg v. Bd. of Revision, 7 Ohio St. 2d 139, 218 N.E.2d 723 (1966).
'u 26 Ohio St. 2d at 164, 270 N.E.2d at 345 (1971).
18 32 Ohio St. 2d 28, 289 N.E.2d 579 (1972). See also notes 113-15 supra and
accompanying text.
' I. at 32, 289 N.E.2d at 582.
188 Id. A procedure had been set out in Amended Senate Bill No. 455 which
was upheld except for the provision establishing current use of real property as
the basis for valuation pursuant to uniform tax assessment.
'87 The applicable formula is: Value x Rate = Taxes Due.
18 State, ex rel Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, Apr. 2, 1980).
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Supreme Court significantly extended the question of uniformity in both
its majority and dissenting opinions. In an original action, David
Swetland sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the Commissioner of
Tax Equalization and the Auditor of Cuyahoga County from applying an
additional 2-1/2% reduction to all homesteads which were qualified.189
The court, in its four to three decision, held that the 2-1/ 2 /o reduction'
was a valid exercise of the General Assembly's power to tax real prop-
erty and to exempt certain classifications of real property as provided
by Article XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution."' The majority was quick to
point out that in previous cases 9 ' the constitutional requirement of
uniformity was interpreted to mandate uniformity in the valuation of
the real property and uniformity in the percentage of value which would
constitute the property tax base.
The central issue of Park Investment V, on the other hand, was the
constitutional authority of the General Assembly to provide for a lower
tax for certain types of real estate by way of exemption or, as in this in-
stance, partial exemption of real estate taxes.'93 The court cited the case
of Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals,'94 in which the court
held that the General Assembly, by reason of amendment of Article XII,
§ 2 of the Ohio Constitution, had the power to determine exemptions from
taxation, limited only by the provisions of Article I of the Ohio Constitu-
tion. Applying the principles of the Denison University case, the court
ruled in the instant case that the General Assembly had acted within its
power in granting the 2-1/2% reduction, and that no distinction can be
made between the General Assembly's use of the word "reduction" as
opposed to "exemption" when trying to demonstrate a violation of the
Ohio Constitution, Article XII, § 2.1"
The court further stated that the "uniform rule" requirement of Article
XII, § 2 beyond assuring uniformity in valuation and assessment,
operated to require that taxpayers shall be afforded equal protection of
the laws under the Constitution in the taxation of real property. The
189 In addition to the 10% reduction granted to all real property pursuant to
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(B) (Page Supp. 1977), see note 63 supra and ac-
companying text.
'91 1979 OHIO LAws at 5-195, in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 323.152(B) (Page Supp.
1977).
'9' State, ex reL Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, Apr. 2, 1980).
192 See in chronological order, State, ex reL Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Ap-
peals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964); Koblenz v. Bd. of Revision, 5 Ohio
St. 2d 214, 215 N.E.2d 384 (1966); Goldberg v. Bd. of Revision, 7 Ohio St. 2d 139,
218 N.E.2d 723 (1966); Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 13 Ohio St. 2d 59,
233 N.E.2d 594 (1968); State, ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 16
Ohio St. 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968); State, ex rel Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Ap-
peals, 26 Ohio St. 2d 161, 270 N.E.2d 342 (1971).
"' State, ex reL Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, Apr. 2, 1980).
,14 Denison Univ. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 2 Ohio St. 2d 17, 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965).
"I State, ex reL Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio Apr. 2, 1980).
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court stated that "[sluch equal protection would require first, that if
there be established classifications of real estate taxpayers, any such
classifications must have a rational basis. Second, the equal protection
provision would dictate that any legislatively established classes be taxed
at a uniform rate."
1 96
The court responded to the realtor's argument that the two and one-
half percent reduction creates an unconstitutional classification of real
estate taxpayers based on "current use" of the real estate by citing
Park Investment IV, noting that classification by way of "current use"
may not be utilized in establishing the basis for valuation.'91 Relative to
the constitutionality of classifications per se, the court stated that "[a]
classification must not be arbitrary, artificial, or evasive, but there must
be a real and substantial distinction in the nature of the class or classes
upon which the law operates."' ' From this language the court clarified a
question presumed answered in Park Investment I, that is, whether
property classification by current use is per se unconstitutional. The
court's negative response to this question will be important when con-
sidering legal alternatives to H.B. 920.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Brown '99 in Park Investment V
presented an additional concept yet to be considered by the Ohio courts.
In what Justice Brown termed "the bottom line," he noted:
Taxation of real property by uniform rule requires three sub-
rules: (1) uniformity in valuation, (2) uniformity in percentage of
value constituting the basis of the tax, and (3) uniformity in tax
rate applied to that base. The holdings and language of the Park
Investment cases concerned exclusively sub-rules (1) and (2)
simply because the situations presented therein did not warrant
broader holdings or more embracing language. Thus, their lack
of specific reference to uniformity in tax rate, i.e., sub-rule (3), is
196 Id.
Id. (Emphasis added).
199 Id., quoting Zenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920).
199 Justice Brown's contention was that since a partial tax exemption was a
euphemism for reducing the percentage of value constituting the base of the real
property tax, the Denison University and Park Investment cases are inconsis-
tent as applied to homesteads. State, ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402
(Sup. Ct., Ohio, Apr. 2, 1980). It would seem, however, that the parts of the tax
bill (i.e., value, rate, credits) while mathematically related in the tax billing pro-
cess, are nonetheless still essentially distinct. This essential distinction is im-
plicitly acknowledged by the fact that the Department of Tax Equalization con-
tinues to approve the value asbstracts from the various counties at 35% of
market value, despite the fact that the net taxes charged after all the credits,
when divided by the gross millage, would produce a tax base far below the 35 %
of true value required by Ohio law. Additionally, the process of determining an
assessed valuation can be done quite independently of any tax rate or tax dollar
charged, demonstrating further the essential distinction between value, rate and
tax.
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demonstrative of judicial self-restraint and not evidence of this
court's earlier desire to fashion a Section 2, Article XII distinc-
tion between the property tax rate, i.e., sub-rule (3), and the
property tax base, i.e. sub-rules (1) and (2). The constitutional
mandate is that real property be "taxed by uniform rule accord-
ing to value." Plainly, by its terms and as interpreted in the
Park Investment cases, this mandate focuses on the bottom line
and not the above implementing sub-rules."'
In light of the court's analysis of the Park Investment cases, the con-
stitutionality of the current calculation and application of the H.B. 920
credit seems highly suspect. Park Investment I through IV
demonstrated that the uniformity in taxation guaranteed under Article
XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution was violated where classes of property
were assessed for taxation at different percentages." t The current ap-
plication of the H.B. 920 credit, while limiting the total dollars collected
on voted levies to the amount collected on properties existing in the
preceding year, would cause the collection of substantially more dollars
from the residential and agricultural classes in the year following a
reappraisal than was collected from those classes in the preceding year
on the same voted levies.0 2 Conversely, the H.B. 920 credit would cause
the collection of substantially fewer dollars from the commercial and in-
dustrial classes in the year following a reappraisal than was collected
from those classes in the preceding year on the same voted levies.0 3
H.B. 920, thus, shifts the tax burden to the residential-agricultural class
in a discriminatory manner. The majority opinion in Park Investment V
stated that the "uniform rule" requirement of Art. XII, § 2 operated "to
require that in the taxation of real property the taxpayers shall be af-
forded equal protection of the laws under the Constitution." ' 4 The
dissenting opinion of Park Investment V asserts that the constitutional
mandate of taxation by uniform rule according to value focuses on the
bottom line. 0 The bottom line of the residential-agricultural tax liability
has been increasing to the benefit of the commercial-industrial tax
liability. The equal protection afforded taxpayers under Article XII, § 2 of
w2 Id
20I See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
202 Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella estimated that residen-
tial taxpayers in tax year 1979 paid 181.6 million dollars for the 1978 tax year.
See Campanella interview, supra note 12. For a hypothetical example of the
same, see notes 152-55 supra and accompanying text.
203 Auditor Campanella estimated that commercial-industrial taxpayers in tax
year 1979 paid $73.9 million on voted levies compared to $83.0 million in the 1978
tax year. See Campanella interview, supra note 12. For a hypothetical example of
the same, see notes 152-55 supra.
204 State, ex reL Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, Apr. 2, 1980).
205 Id
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the Ohio Constitution would demand a change in the computation and
application of the H.B. 920 tax credit.
IV. A REMEDY FOR AMENDED HOUSE BILL 920
A. Credit by Class
The problem from which both residential and agricultural properties
suffer under the current computation and application of the tax credit
can be remedied by the use of a tax credit which is computed according
to class of property. This solution was proposed as early as April, 1977,
by Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella'"6 who, in mid-1978,
teamed up with County Treasurer Francis E. Gaul,"'? to promote a plan
for tax reform around this central concept.
The credit by class concept would adopt the principle of the tax credit
from H.B. 920, but would compute and apply the credit by class of prop-
erty. The initial classifications were residential, commercial, industrial
and argicultural. 20 8 A demonstration of this proposal can be given, using
the data of the hypothetical example cited above.
2
1
9
1978 TAX YEAR
Market Value $50,000 (Taxable Value-$17,500)210
Residential $17,500 x 50 mills $ 875
Commercial $17,500 x 50 mills$ 875
TOTAL TAXES $ 1,750
1979 TAX YEAR
Residential Market Value - $69,000 (+ 38%) Taxable Value - $24,150
Commercial Market Value - $57,500 (+ 15%) Taxable Value - $20,125
Residential Tax Credit (Value increase - Current Year Value)
($24,150 - $17,500) + $24,150 = .275362
' The Plain Dealer, Apr. 21, 1977, at B-3, col. 2.
1 The Clev. Press, June 23, 1978, at A4, col. 4-5. In June, 1976, Francis Gaul,
Cuyahoga County Treasurer, had started an initiative petition drive to place a
constitutional proposition on the November 1976 or June 1977 ballot to reverse
the effects of the Park Investment decisions. Finnarn, supra note 76, at 1193-94.
" The Plain Dealer, Apr. 21, 1977, at B-3, col. 3-6. Apparently realizing that
the four classes were not all-inclusive, the constitutional amendment which Cam-
panella and Gaul were circulating as an initiative petition contained the afore-
mentioned classed together with public utility real estate and mineral property.
Initiative Petition, titled Property Tax Reform amending Article XII, § 2 of the
Ohio Constitution, Petition #14930, obtained during Campanella interview, supra
note 12 (on file with author).
See notes 152-55 supra and accompanying text.
2o See note 152 supra.
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Commercial Tax Credit (Value increase Current Year Value)
($20,125 - $17,500) - $20,125 = .130435
1979 Taxes Residential Commercial Total
Assessed Value $24,150 $20,125
x Tax Rate 50 mills 50 mills
Gross Tax $ 1,208 $ 1,006
Less "Class" Credit ($ 333) ($ 131)
Net Tax Due $ 875 $ 875 $1,750
The above example demonstrates that with the application of the "class
credit" the voted taxes for both the residential and the commercial
property maintain a level constant with the prior year despite respec-
tive value increases of 38% and 15%. Under the current H.B. 920 computa-
tion and application of the credit, the residential taxes had increased
$80 while the commercial taxes decreased $80."' In light of the above
example, the equity and uniformity in taxation demanded under Article
XII, § 2 seem to clearly demand the implementation of the credit by
class concept.
B. Implementation of Credit by Class
The implementation of a tax credit by class could have been fashioned
through various legislative mechanisms ranging from a procedural
amendment issued by the Commissioner of Tax Equalization to a con-
stitutional amendment. This note will briefly review these mechanisms,
attempting to highlight any advantages and disadvantages of each.
The most informal method for implementing the credit by class con-
cept consisted of a redetermination by the Commissioner of Tax Equali-
zation that the data212 collected to calculate the H.B. 920 credit be sub-
mitted by class." 3 The determination of a reduction factor would then be
done by class of property, and the class reduction factors would be cer-
tified to the county auditors. This method, however, would have had a
tenuous legal defense at best, for while the statute authorizing the
reduction factor"4 did not expressly prohibit the calculation by class, it
authorized only a percentage by which the sums were to be reduced as
opposed to percentages. Calculation of reduction factor by class would
have to rest on the defense that the former method of calculating was in
violation of taxation by uniform rule as guaranteed under Article XII, § 2
of the Ohio Constitution. By granting this, however, the proper remedy
would seem to have been merely a revision of unconstitutional statutes
by the General Assembly. Likewise, a designation of classes for which
2 See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
"1" See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text.
212 Taxable values must be reported by class to the Department of the Tax
Equalization for approval. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
21. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1977).
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separate tax credits would be calculated would have to have been deter-
mined by the Commissioner of Tax Equilization, whose legal authority
to determine such classes could have been challenged.
2 1 5
The General Assembly could also have provided for the implementa-
tion of credit by class. An amendment of the statute which created the
H.B. 920 credit" 6 could have been enacted, designating various classes of
property which would receive their own tax credit. Such a statute
would have been subject solely to a constitutional challenge, and would
have appeared defensible based on the arguments, decisions and opin-
ions of Park Investment I through IV as analyzed above.
In order to avoid relatively certain litigation on constitutional
grounds, 217 the General Assembly decided to propose to the voters of
Ohio a constitutional amendment, amending Article XII, § 2 and estab-
lishing certain classes of property for use in the tax reduction process. 8
This was surely the most conservative approach, subject only to
challenge under the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution
2 1 9
and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
C. Credit by Class in Current Legislation
With the concurrence of the Ohio House in the conference committee
report on July 21, 1980, the Ohio General Assembly finalized the
language of a constitutional amendment authorizing a credit by class.2
The Ohio electorate was to vote on the amendment in the November
1980 general election. The tax reform amendment, House Joint Resolu-
tion 39,21 proposed classifying property into two categories, residential-
agricultural and commercial-industrial,222 to allow for property tax relief
through a tax credit by class. The proposed amendment, however, seemed
to contain a major stumbling block to Republican lawmakers; they
211 The Commissioner of Tax Equalization is given authority under Ohio law to
prescribe such general and uniform rules and issue such orders and instructions,
not inconsistent with law, as he deems necessary, as to the exercise of powers
and the discharge of the duties of all officers which relate to the assessment of
property and the levy and collection of taxes. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.29
(Page 1980). He also prescribes the forms necessary for the collection of the data.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.30 (Page 1980).
211 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1977).
217 Park Investment IV was immediately filed in part to challenge the General
Assembly's provision for "current use" in the appraisal and assessment process
in S.B. 455.
211 Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella called the amendment a
partial adoption of the Gaul-Campanella Initiative Petition. The Plain Dealer,
Sept. 22, 1980, at A-23, col. 2.
219 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
- 394 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.), July 21, 1980, at 1.
11 Id. It was enumerated as Issue One on the November 1980 ballot.
Legislative Digest and Review, July 11, 1980, at 1.
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argued that the proposal should use the year 197523 as the base year
from which property tax values should be rolled back to provide the tax
relief."4 They insisted that the amendment would not provide any tax
relief 5 if the 1975 base year was not used. Two local Cuyahoga County
officials.. 6 agreed with the Republican lawmakers, citing that the tax
relief bill would not save the homeowners in their county any tax
dollars until 1982, and at this point it would mean only $9 million less of
an increase." 7 They insisted that their proposal, which included the use
of the 1975 base year upon which to calculate the class credit, would pro-
vide initial immediate relief to the homeowner or farmer in the amount
of $28 million on a countrywide basis." Even with passage of the con-
stitutional amendment, however, the final version of the tax relief
package was to remain hazy, since full implementation of the constitu-
tional mandates would require additional statutory reworking."
On November 4, 1980, the electorate of the state of Ohio passed State
Issue I by an estimated majority of 53% to 47%.30 In anticipation of
such passage both the Senate and the House of Representatives had in-
troduced legislation which would implement the provisions of the new
constitutional amendment.31 The two pieces of legislation differed only
in their approach to the initial year's tax credit calculation. The Senate
version of the implementing legislation, Senate Bill 443 (S.B. 433), provided
= The year prior to the passage of H.B. 920.
= 393 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.), July 18, 1980, at 1. The
description of "property tax values rolled back" was a slight misnomer, as the
legislature's argument seemed to more logically mean using 1975 as a base year
to calculate tax credit percentages by class, so that the inequitable effect of H.B.
920 could be eliminated.
15 Representative Matthew Hatchadorian described the amendment as a "half
baked" proposal that "offers the promise of tax relief but doesn't deliver." He fur-
ther insisted that by accepting the committee report, the House would be bailing
out the Senate where the measure had been left pending for almost a year. See
note 16 supra for the background to the issue; 394 Ohio Report (Gongwer News
Service, Inc.), July 21, 1980, at 1. Senator Thomas Van Meter also contended that
elimination of the 1975 base year would lock the H.B. 920 shifts in place per-
manently. 393 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.), July 18, 1980, at 1.
Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella and Cuyahoga County
Treasurer Francis E. Gaul.
The Plain Dealer, July 22, 1980, at A-9, col. 3.
The Clev. Press, July 25, 1980, at B4, col. 2.
394 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.), July 21, 1980, at 1.
22 42 Legislative Digest and Review, Nov. 7, 1980 at 2. Unofficial results in-
dicate that the vote was 1,962,875 in favor to 1,774,123 against. The Plain
Dealer, Nov. 6, 1980, at A-32, col. 1.
23, Senate Bill 443 was introduced September 18, 1980. 436 Ohio Report
(Gongwer News Service, Inc.), September 18, 1980, at 5. House Bill 1238 was in-
troduced September 9, 1980. 429 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.),
September 9, 1980, at 5. For Cuyahoga County, this would take calculations back
to tax year 1975.
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that the initial calculation of the tax credits by class should correct the
shift in the tax burden which had occurred since the inception of H.B.
920 in 1976.3 ' The House version, House Bill 1238, provided that the in-
itial calculation should refer only to preventing future years' tax
shifts.2 - Any inequities which had occurred prior to the passage of Issue
I were not to be rectified. The difference between the two approaches
can be more easily understood with the contiuned use of hypothetical
property:1
3
H.B. 920
Tax Year 1975
Taxable Value
Tax Rate = Mills
(voted)
1975 TOTAL TAX
Tax Year 1976
Taxable Value
X Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Less "920" Credit
(.209486)
Net Tax Due
Tax year 1979
Taxable Value
X Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Less "920" Credit
(.380213)
Net Tax Due
Residential
Parcel
$17,500
50 mills
$ 875
Residential
Parcel
$24,150 (+ 38%)
50 mills
$ 1,208
($ 253)
$ 955
$33,327 (+ 38%)
50 mills
$ 1,666
($ 633)
$ 1,033
Commercial Collection
Parcel Total
$17,500
50 mills
$ 875 $1,750
Commercial Collection
Parcel Total
$20,125 (+ 15%)
50 mills
$ 1,006
($ 211)
$ 795 $1,750
$23,144 (+ 15%)
50 mills
$ 1,157
($ 440)
$ 717 $1,750
22 S.B. No. 443, 113th General Assembly. This key element, the correction of
the 1976 to 1979 shifts in tax burden, had been a source of argument in the initial
draft of the constitutional amendment. See notes 225-28 supra and accompanying
text.
2 H.B. No. 1238, 113th General Assembly.
See notes 152-55 supra and accompanying text.
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H.B. 1238
Tax Year 1980
Taxable Value
X Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Less "920" Credit
by Class
(Res. .380213)
(Comm. .380213)
Net Tax Due
Tax Year 1982
Taxable Value
X Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Less "920" Credit
by Class
(Res. .550876)
(Comm. .461063)
Net Tax Due
Tax Year 1980
Taxable Value
X Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Less "920" Credit
by Class
(Res. .474900)
(Comm. .243865)
Net Tax Due
Tax Year 1982
Taxable Value
X Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Less "920" Credit
by Class
(Res. .619490)
(Comm. .342501)
Net Tax Due
Residential
Parcel
$33,327 (+ 0%)
50 mills
$ 1,666
($ 633)
$ 1,033 (1979
Level)
$45,991 ( + 38%)
50 mills
$ 2,300
($ 1,267)
$ 1,033 (Maintair
1979
Level)
S.B. 443
Residential
Parcel
$33,327 (+ 0%)
50 mills
$ 1,666
($ 791)
$ 875 (1975
Level)
$45,991 (+ 38%)
50 mills
$ 2,300
($ 1,425)
$ 875
Commercial
Parcel
$23,144(+ 0%)
50 mills
$ 1,157
($ 440)
$ 717
$26,616 (+ 15%)
50 mills
$ 1,331
($ 614)
i $ 717
Commercial
Parcel
$23,144(+ 0%)
50 mills
$ 1,157
($ 282)
$ 875
$26,616 (+ 15%)
50 mills
$ 1,331
($ 456)
$ 875 $1,750
1981]
Collection
Total
$1,750
$1,750
Collection
Total
$1,750
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On November 13th, the House of Representatives passed H.B. 1238
almost unanimously 25 and sent it to the Senate for passage. The Senate
amended the bill, adding the essence of S.B. 433, or the calculation of a
new class credit retroactive to the year prior to the implementation of
H.B. 920.2' After the House refused to concur in the Senate amend-
ment, 37 the bill was sent to a conference committee, where the amend-
ment was removed upon assurances from the Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee that proposals for "rolling back
valuations"2 8 to some base year would be considered in detail in the
coming year.2 39 With the approval of both the House and Senate,24" a
property tax credit by class was to finally become a reality for the 1981
tax collection.
The implementation of "credit by class" in H.B. 1238 must be viewed
in the narrow perspective of the immediate administrative tool for State
Issue I. It does not address the rectification of the constitutional unifor-
mity question under H.B. 920; this is specifically evidenced in the above
hypothetical. The tax increase of $15841 to the residential taxpayer be-
tween 1975 and 1979 still remains in 1980 under H.B. 1238. Similarly, the
tax reduction of $158 to the commercial taxpayer, a direct result of the
residential taxpayer's increase, continues to accrue annually to the com-
mercial property. State Issue I did not revoke the constitutional re-
quirement for uniformity; rather, it promoted it by mandating credit by
class. Yet, H.B. 1238 provided the legislative guarantee of only future
uniformity. In the face of these enactments, any inaction on the correc-
tion of the tax shift during the "920 years" must appear as an inex-
plicable, legal anomaly.
V. CONCLUSION
More than fifteen years ago, the Park Investment Company sought a
judicial remedy to what it deemed was inequitable taxation of real prop-
" The final vote was eighty-six to one. 474 Ohio Report (Gonger News Ser-
vice, Inc.), Nov. 13, 1980, at 3.
23 The vote was twenty to twelve, with six Cleveland area Democrats joining
Republican Senate members who had tried in vain during earlier debates to
establish retroactivity for calculation. 482 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service,
Inc.), Nov. 25, 1980, at 2.
2 Id. at 7.
23 This was a technical misstatement. The actual intention was to rollback the
valuation ratios, for example, the ratio of residential-agricultural to all other
properties to some base year.
239 483 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.), Nov. 26, 1980, at 1.
240 The final vote was twenty-two to seven in the Senate and sixty-nine to
eleven in the House. I& at 3.
241 Residential-1979 Net Tax $1,033
Residential- 1975 Net Tax 875
INCREASE $ 158
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erty. The aftermath of that decisive event is still being felt, and even
with the recently approved constitutional amendment, 42 is very likely to
continue if the preceptions of local politicians are in any way accurate."'2
With more than half the local government revenue generated in the
United States originating with the property tax, 44 willing abandonment
of this revenue source by local governments must be discounted as
unrealistic. Alternatively, with the Ohio Supreme Court's recent
acknowledgement of the depressing economic effect which inflation, in-
creased costs of governmental functions and high taxes have had on the
average homeowner,2'5 continued pursuit of effective tax relief in an
equitable tax system would seem to be the political order of the day, if
not the decade.2 6 The pursuit of effective tax relief will, of necessity,
continue to raise some essential questions. Undoubtedly, a most obvious
question remains as to which method of tax relief is most effective. Still
to be addressed is the broader philosophical and political question of un-
voted tax increases.2 41 In whatever manner these questions are addressed,
the constitutional guarantee of uniformity in taxation must always re-
main inviolate, assuring judicial equity, not necessarily mathematical
duplication.
Some of these issues may be resolved due to the Ohio Legislatures re-
cent activities. On Wednesday, July 1, 1981, with the Ohio House of
Representatives' reconsideration and concurrence, Amended Substitute
242 See notes 220-22 supra and accompanying text.
242 See notes 225-28 supra and accompanying text.
244 IAAO, supra note 19, at 5.
242 The majority opinion in Park Investment V stated:
Our nation and our state are experiencing disturbing, if not distress-
ing, times in our economy. Our citizens are confronted with one of the
greatest inflationary trends in recent U.S. history, authoritatively
reported to have been at the level of nearly 14 percent increase in 1979.
All are hard pressed to meet private and individual needs as well as to
meet those obligations mandated upon all of us by the seemingly
evergrowing cost of governmental functions. Taxes, while necessary, are
becoming a burdensome problem for our citizens -most particularly the
homeowner who has been experiencing marked cost increases in every
facet of home ownership.
State, ex. reL Swetland v. Kinney, No. 79-1402 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, Apr. 2, 1980).
24' Cuyahoga County Auditor Vincent C. Campanella and Treasurer Francis E.
Gaul announced at a July 21, 1980 news conference that they were continuing to
pursue their own initiative petition drive for a constitutional amendment. This
announcement was made in reaction to the legislature's approval of the ballot
form of the constitutional amendment on property tax reform. Official statement
by Frank Gaul and Vince Campanella, July 21, 1980, at 3.
247 The initiative petition constitutional amendment of Campanella-Gaul has a
provision which allows the reduction of taxes previously exempt under H.B. 920.
Initiative petition, entitled Property Tax Reform Amending Article XII, Section
2 of the Ohio Constitution, Petition #14930.
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House Bill 50,8 the legislation necessary to rectify the tax shift during
the "920 years," finally became reality.249 The law requires that the "920
class credit for tax year 1981 be adjusted to reflect the proportion in
which property tax burdens were distributed to each class in the year
immediately preceding the first reappraisal or triennial update in which
taxes were reduced" pursuant to Amended Substitute House Bill 920 of
the 111th General Assembly, or in the case of a tax levy voted after the
passage of House Bill 920, in the year prior to the enactment of the tax
levy .250
Cuyahoga County Auditor Matthew J. Hatchadorian, however, in-
dicated that the question of corrective tax relief still may not have been
finally settled as business interests may challenge the law in the
courts."5 ' Perhaps the Park Investment saga and its accompanying tax
reform legislation have yet to have their final day in court.
ROBERT P. RINK
248 124 Ohio Report (Gongwer News Service, Inc.), July 1, 1981, at 2. See also
The Plain Dealer. July 2, 1981, at A-1, col. 1.
249 Governor James A. Rhodes signed the legislation into law on July 11, 1981,
in Cuyahoga County. The Plain Dealer, July 12, 1981, at A-34, col. 1. Tax relief
to the residential taxpayers of Cuyahoga County alone was estimated to be in the
area of 8/o to 15% by County Treasurer Francis E. Gaul and County Auditor
Matthew J. Hatchadorian. The Plain Dealer, July 2, 1981, at A-i, col. 6.
25 Amended Substitute House Bill 50 (advance sheets).
251 The Plain Dealer, July 2, 1981, at A-i, col. 6. Hatchadorian, in the same
statement, indicated he believed such challenge would not be successful.
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APPENDIX A
HOW TO COMPUTE YOUR TAX BILL
PROPERTY TAX COMPUTATION
MARKET VALUE X 357.
ASSESSED VALUE X MILLAGE
- ASSESSED VALUE
- GROSS TAX PER YEAR
EXAMPLE
EUCLID - $50,000 HOME
$50,000 x .35
17,500 X .0668
(66.80 MILLS)
GROSS TAX x H.B. 920 PERCENTAGE
CREDIT - H.B. 920 CREDIT
GROSS TAX - H.B. 920 CREDIT
NET TAX - 107. ROLLBACK
NET TAX - 2 1/27. ROLLBACK
TAX DUE - 2
HALF YEAR TAX + SPECIAL
ASSESSMENTS, PENALTIES.
DELINQUENCIES
- NET TAX
- NET TAX
- TAX DUE
- HALF YEAR TAX
- TAX BILL
1.169.00 X .296510
1,169.00 - 346.62
822.38 - 82.24
740.14 - 20.56
719.58 2 - $ 359.79
359.79 + 5.65
+0+0
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APPENDIX D
CREDIT CTLCULATIONS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY
(BASED ON VALUE INCREASES FROM 1978 TO 1979)
HB. 920
CREDIT
RESIDEHTIAL COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL
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